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Abstract 
Almost everyone agrees that gun ownership is part of the 
complex fabric of values and traditions that comprise 
American society. All sides in the gun ownership debate 
understand that firearms are embedded deeply in America’s 
society and culture. But whereas for some the right to own 
guns is a non-negotiable promise guaranteed constitutionally, 
for others it is far more an element of the American experience 
than is desirable. This essay examines three arguments which 
have not usually received full treatment in analytical debates, 
but which may help us to reframe the sharp polarization that 
now characterizes the discourse. The first relies on 
distinctively American ideals of liberty, property rights, and 
the right of protection from the state. The second considers the 
implications of American liberty and property across 
contemporary culture. The final argument captures a 
somewhat more obscure aspiration in American life: the 
freedom which can be enjoyed only when society has achieved 
the public good of safety from deadly firearms.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
t seems impossible to imagine a world in which issue of 
gun ownership no longer divides American society. 
The discourse as it currently exists is so polarized that we 
are required to analyze two deeply opposed and frequently 
hostile camps: gun ownership supporters against those who 
demand restrictions on ownership of firearms. Many 
Americans view gun ownership as their most cherished 
right of citizenship; others view it as the least desirable 
feature of the contemporary American life. Many 
Americans advocate unfettered freedom to own firearms 
while others desire a society entirely rid of gun violence; 
free, that is to say, not only of the higher rates of suicide 
and homicide which clearly accompany gun ownership 
(Stroebe 2013), but free perhaps even from the very 
existence of guns.  
 
To imagine a world in which gun ownership is no longer a 
divisive issue is difficult indeed. The aim of this essay is to 
offer a set of perspectives which do not necessarily belong 
to either side. By explaining and defending these lines of 
argument, my goal is to shine new light on the dilemma; 
through them, I think a path can be sketched which avoids 
the radical polarization that obstructs progress on this issue 
of monumental concern.  
 
Regardless of their position, nearly everyone involved in 
the gun ownership debate neglects or ignores claims which 
their opponents consider to be non-negotiable. Firearm 
ownership promoters—and this is equally true for those 
who would restrict gun ownership—hold tightly to their 
own presuppositions, even as they reject views held with 
equal assurance by those on the other side.  
I 
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Let me provide some background in a review of the 
standard positions. Our purpose in surveying the positions 
is not to establish points of evaluation; at this stage, we 
want simply to get our bearings on the gun ownership 
discourse at the most general level, on the overall structure 
of arguments that distinguish the two sides.  
 
Gun ownership supporters emphasize any number of the 
following arguments: (i) Second Amendment rights; (ii) 
responsible gun ownership; (iii) the centrality of self-defence; 
and (iv) the pervasiveness of gun-owning celebrities and 
politicians. In greater detail, they hold that the U.S. 
Constitution already guarantees unfettered gun ownership 
rights (i); that gun ownership is overwhelmingly safe in terms 
of the practices of a majority of gun owners (ii); that gun 
ownership is embedded in the fundamental right of self-
defence (iii); and that experts and celebrities at all levels of 
contemporary society support the freedom to own guns and 
make that freedom part of their public lives (iv).  
 
We can view these arguments as elements in a more or less 
coherent platform or position. We can imagine them being 
put forth in a lecture auditorium, where each argument is 
meant by advocates to convince a large audience; each will 
play a part in using rational force and moral suasion to 
convince informed members of the audience to endorse a 
specific side of the issue. The arguments are best seen as 
elements of a platform because none of them can be 
assumed to achieve universal validity by itself. Each has a 
role to play in a larger debate or discourse.   
 
Against the gun ownership position, critics offer a different 
family of arguments, which lead to a very different 
platform. They focus on: (i) increasing mass shootings; (ii) 
patterns of irresponsible gun ownership; (iii) and expert 
testimony, in the form of advocacy by such professional 
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groups as the association of American Family Physicians.i 
These critics hold that horrific crimes by psychopaths and 
terrorists make it necessary to establish restrictions on the 
availability of guns (i); that even though some owners 
practice gun safety, others express this freedom 
dangerously and irresponsibly (ii); and that many experts 
favour greater gun restrictions and are critical of the current 
state of gun availability in the United States (iii).  
 
Again, we should view these arguments as elements in a 
unified platform. In our large lecture hall, members of the 
gun-restricting camp offer these claims in an effort to 
convince the audience of the viability of their position. As 
above, none of these critical claims about gun ownership can 
assume universal validity; they are best seen as part of a wider 
effort to convince society to adopt, for their own private 
reasons, a view that supports gun ownership restrictions.  
 
The reader will have likely begun to evaluate and engage 
with one of the two platforms and their component 
arguments. It is natural to engage one side or the other, as 
informed members of society always should. How can we 
not look at the arguments above with a view to assessing 
their quality? In what follows, I want to develop a slightly 
different approach. I propose to draw back from 
engagement with specific arguments and look instead at 
what may have been overlooked as the debate’s veteran 
interests pushed their points of view. I want to think about 
the gun discourse itself, and to decide if any arguments 
were swept aside which deserve further attention. Our 
purpose is to approach the gun ownership discourse from 
this wide perspective, and to trace out a few considerations 
which have been neglected or ignored.  
 
At this general level, what else can be said about the 
American gun ownership discourse? It is an inclusive 
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discourse, at least in some respects. Despite its binary 
platforms and the influence of ideology, it reflects a 
society-wide conversation where the views of American 
citizens determine the legitimacy of a policy or political 
decision. It is a discourse occurring at highest political 
level, in which major interests are involved. Major interests 
are represented by large and well-funded political action 
groups, and also in the sense that gun control is the 
perennial electoral issue in American politics. A 
candidate’s position on this single issue can decide a 
significant pattern of political support, not to mention 
campaign endorsements and contributions. Even compared 
to other major issues, the efficiency and mobilization of 
gun ownership advocacy groups has been an increasingly 
predominant factor at all levels of electoral politics nearly 
everywhere in the United States.   
 
Moreover, although the gun ownership discourse was once 
strictly a national debate, focused on U.S. domestic 
concerns, the debate has long since internationalized. 
American politics carries influence far past the U.S. border, 
and many countries follow the lead of American democracy 
in unseen ways. The domestic discourse inside the United 
States influences the agenda in many domestic discourses 
around the world, and in a world of globalization and 
international commerce, the availability of guns in one 
national jurisdiction always impacts activities in many 
neighboring jurisdictions.    
 
Of course, none of these considerations imply that the gun 
ownership discourse is without hope or remedy. But there 
is a truly enormous gap, both real and ideological, that 
places Americans in one of two exclusive camps. 
Researchers have demonstrated that ownership of guns is 
typically strongest with in certain demographics. For 
example, Gius (2008) shows that ownership of deadly 
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weapons overwhelmingly far more frequently among white 
men of a certain age, while Americans as a demographic 
whole are immensely less likely to own or possess a gun. 
His results confirm that “Caucasians, males and those who 
are married are more likely to own guns, while persons 
under the age of 25 years, and over the age of 65 years, as 
well as college-educated persons are less likely to own 
guns” (Gius 498). The reasons for this distribution are 
obviously complex, but it seems clear enough that for some 
Americans gun ownership becomes something much 
deeper than a negotiable feature of recreational preference.  
 
The significance of guns and gun ownership is partly 
sociological, for gun ownership is deeply established in 
American culture. But gun ownership is also a distinctive 
and authentic American right, guaranteed in specific 
respects by the U.S. Constitution. And on the other side, 
gun ownership defenders neglect a central feature of their 
opponents’ platform; their vision of society as free from 
guns, in other words free from the human damage that 
excessive ownership of guns produces. Supporters of gun 
ownership fail to see how that society is for everyone’s 
benefit; that a society free of gun violence is an equally 
important fundamental right.  
 
To be sure, there are a few fixed propositions in this 
discourse, as in any other. If freedom to own guns is 
dangerous to public safety, gun ownership advocates can 
and should come to endorse whatever restrictions are 
deemed necessary to show sufficient concern for the 
public’s safety. “Whether the social costs of gun ownership 
are positive or negative is arguably the most fundamental 
question for the regulation of firearms in the United States” 
(Cook and Ludwig 2006: 380). I admit that this proposition 
needs clarity to be fully convincing—clarity about what 
constitutes “sufficient concern for public safety”, and I 
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don’t claim to resolve the question here. I only wish to 
point out that no one is right to disregard principles of 
concern for public safety. But there are few such universal 
propositions on offer in the American gun ownership 
discourse, and even this one is sometimes denied.  
 
So let us consider an alternative approach. In other 
situations, much closer to home, when our personal 
positions are inescapably fixed, we might elect to utilize the 
services of a “mediator” who would be willing and able to 
provide the partisans with unseen but mutually beneficial 
alternatives. The role of mediators is always subject to 
restrictions, and seldom do mediators achieve admiration 
from either side, for partisans are disposed against 
moderation. But the mediator’s efforts are sometimes 
desirable to all parties. Some disputes can never be 
unlocked without the mediator’s advice.  
 
The role of mediator is not that of an objective referee. In 
this debate no set of rules is perfectly absolute. This is one 
reason why the gun ownership discourse remains divided; 
those rules or parameters which would facilitate debate or 
provide structure to the discourse are themselves subject to 
dispute. So again, the role of mediator is inherently 
restrictive. Nor can a non-partisan mediator endorse any 
argument with genuine commitment. There is an 
artificiality to how the mediator must abstractly approach 
arguments which the rest of us press with full conviction. 
But it’s equally true that the mediator enjoys her own space 
of freedom, for it is part of her role to remain open to the 
unorthodox and untried point of view.  
 
In what follows, I will attempt to assume such a role. I will 
offer a discussion of certain foundational issues in the gun 
ownership discourse; and while some of them will seem 
familiar, others will come across as new and unexplored. 
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My aim is to show that even though the common positions 
are profoundly divided, and misunderstanding remains the 
order of the day, we might still plot a few perspectives that 
represent a path of reconciliation in what is perhaps the 
most disruptive political discourse in America today.     
 
GUN OWNERSHIP 
 
We first need to grapple with common arguments which 
are thought to emerge from the U.S. Constitution’s Second 
Amendment.ii On one level, we need to question the 
sacrosanct notion of unfettered rights created by the Second 
Amendment. On another, we need to reflect on the proper 
status of guns as private property of a particularly 
significant kind, which for many citizens is a deep 
manifestation of American liberty.  
 
The essence of the challenge to unfettered Second 
Amendment rights is simply this: all laws are subject to 
revision, even long-standing constitutional amendments. 
Many believe that once Second Amendment the issue of 
gun ownership is immediately resolved. After all, the “right 
to bear arms” seems to admit neither restriction nor 
limitation on the freedom of American citizens. Against 
this common view, let me suggest that the U.S. 
Constitution may be sacrosanct, but its individual 
provisions are always subject to interpretation and possible 
revision. It’s easy to forget this constitutional reality 
because it seems impossible to achieve the kind of 
necessary consensus. But the discussion doesn’t end with 
invocations of the Second Amendment; all rights are 
subject to adjustment of their scope and consideration of 
their social impact.   
 
To understand why, consider a situation where all citizens, 
all branches of government, fully supported the same 
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proposal with respect to the Second Amendment. If we 
imagine a situation of universal trust, it’s not difficult to 
conceive of proposals for reform. (In fact, all that is 
required from a legal perspective to change the Amendment 
is a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress.) In 
such a case, difficult is it may be to conceive, it seems 
unquestionable that the Second Amendment could, as it 
should, be amended to reflect the people’s consensus.   
 
The example reminds us that supporters of gun ownership 
ought not to focus such attention on the legal claims 
enshrined in the Second Amendment. Still, a compelling 
line of argument is found in the linkages that exist among 
the values of personal liberty, private ownership and 
freedom from state coercion, and we can find a more 
convincing source of legitimacy expressed in the U.S. 
Constitution as a whole; while the Second Amendment is 
subject to modification, it would be unwise for any higher 
court judge, for example, to disregard the values of liberty 
and property that make up the core of the U.S. Constitution.   
 
I believe that gun ownership is fixed deeply in a complex 
fabric of American liberty. Gun ownership was singled out 
early and has been constantly reinforced as not simply one 
kind of physical property that can be legitimately owned, but 
as both an instrument and a symbol of personal and political 
liberty. Gun ownership became a distinctive symbol and 
manifold instrument of the private freedom expressed in a 
most comprehensive way throughout the Constitution.   
 
Keeping this view of the U.S. Constitution in the background, 
at least two arguments can be put forward for consideration 
by our mediator. The first is a historically-based argument 
draws directly on connections between liberty and property 
found throughout the Constitution. To appreciate it, we must 
look to philosophical arguments about property rights 
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associated with the John Locke (1632-18704), who was the 
first Western thinker to acknowledge the importance of 
property to individual freedom.  
 
To speak of “ownership” and “property” is to invoke rights 
or entitlements set forth by law to protect citizens’ 
belongings. Condensing Locke’s argument slightly, Locke 
said that private property is one of our “natural rights”; the 
things we own ought to be protected for us by government; 
any governing authority that considers itself politically 
legitimate should safeguard, and should never abscond 
with, the rightful property of individual citizens. Locke’s 
major work Two Treatises of Government (1689) contains a 
sustained defence of the position that ownership of property 
is a privileged right; one of the non-negotiable features that 
form the foundation of social life according to the 
American social narrative.  
 
Locke’s appeal to liberty and private property profoundly 
influenced America’s founding fathers. When Thomas 
Jefferson (1743-1826) composed the opening words of the 
Declaration of Independence (1775-6), these ideas were 
very much in circulation, and both the philosopher and the 
political leader in Jefferson were deeply moved by Locke’s 
view of property as the foundation of a free and legitimate 
government. It is not accidental that the Declaration of 
Independence follows Locke’s political philosophy in 
striking ways.   
 
Whether in the form of exchangeable resources like money, 
or in the form of land and estates, the government of each 
state retains the prerogative to use force in confiscating that 
which is owned by individual citizens. Thinkers like Locke 
and Jefferson realized the threat to private property posed 
by governments. Their doctrines reveal a warranted 
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concern with the danger that the governing regime will 
seize the legitimate holdings of individual citizens.   
 
Note the universal implications of Locke’s argument in 
terms of institutionalizing socially beneficial patterns of 
ownership. His view underpins a society that benefits all 
citizens by incentivizing the active development of lands 
and other external resources. Locke is urging individuals to 
develop themselves, and their holdings, in ways that 
advances the value of the whole community.   
 
The second argument relies on the value of personal liberty. 
Once we acknowledge, as did Locke and Jefferson, that 
ownership of property is a natural right, we give credence 
to the view that each citizen’s property is fundamental to 
that citizen’s personhood. Property is not merely a 
philosophical abstraction. It becomes part of the citizen and 
fundamental to their liberty, in the sense that no life can be 
lived, and no personal project executed, without access to 
certain protections of property. Property is fundamental to 
personal liberty and is a means of protecting citizen’s 
individual plans of life. Therefore the state should protect 
and preserve private property; doing so is the only way to 
genuinely safeguard individual autonomy.   
 
The discussion of Locke, Jefferson, and the U.S. 
Constitution reveals the centrality of property in American 
life and liberty. In short, both Locke and Jefferson realized 
that property becomes embedded in each citizen’s social 
existence. In both a real and metaphorical sense, the 
citizen’s property becomes the citizen. My claim is that the 
role of private property in actualizing one’s individual plan 
of life, and even more importantly, the dangers involved in 
coercively confiscating a citizen’s property, set a high 
threshold of justification for proposals to challenge existing 
(legitimately held) guns.  
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Consider how true these claims become when the property 
at issue is a firearm. There is perhaps no greater source of 
security than owning a gun—at least this is how many gun 
owners characterize their feelings. Ownership of a firearm 
provides the owner with unequalled capacity to protect his 
or her life and liberties should they face a threat from those 
with nefarious intent.  
 
American liberty can be characterized in a host of 
terminologies. It is “republican” in the sense that American 
liberty is based on central documents to which all 
American citizens pledge allegiance. It is “democratic” in 
that liberty rights in the United States of America are 
enjoyed in the context of a society of equals. Each 
terminology casts a unique light on important dimensions 
of a highly complex political society. I have been 
characterizing American liberty as the embodiment of what 
is called possessive individualism; American liberty is 
imbued with a vision of the citizen as the sole proprietor of 
his or her rights; the agent, or operator, who is free, as are 
all other citizens, in their possession of political rights. The 
political theorist C.B. Macpherson defined possessive 
individualism in the following way. “The individual,” he 
said, “is free inasmuch as [she] is proprietor of [her] 
personal capacities. The human essence is freedom from 
dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a 
function of possession.”iii In each of the earlier political 
ideologies gun ownership can be said to give priority of 
place in the United States of America. But the possessive 
character of the U.S. Constitution underpins a kind of 
natural resistance to new restrictions on ownership of guns.  
 
Neither Locke nor Jefferson directly explored the modern 
issue of firearms ownership. The point of the discussion 
above is that gun ownership, indeed, ownership of private 
property in general, is the fundamental legal conception 
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intended in Constitutional documents; consequently that 
this conception has continuously embedded itself in U.S. 
society and culture in the centuries since the founding of 
the Republic.  
 
But we can nevertheless trace out the view that gun 
ownership, like other forms of ownership, comes to be part 
of owners’ lives. Here, my claim is that the view of 
property espoused by Locke goes to the very heart of the 
distinctively American sense of individual liberty; that it is 
an essential feature of the American “social contract”; and 
that it therefore deserves an honoured place in 
consideration of legal rights of ownership. To put the point 
in slightly different terms, the truly compelling legal 
argument available to gun ownership supporters is found in 
the view that gun ownership belongs in the realm of 
“privileged rights”, which, like other such rights, enjoy 
non-negotiable status in the American social contract.  
 
We began the section with a discussion of Second 
Amendment rights, which are viewed by many as carved in 
stone. I suggested that the Second Amendment is subject to 
constitutional revision, hence the rights enshrined there are 
normal subjects of debate and deliberation by Americans. 
But this barely scratches the surface of a much more 
substantive view of gun ownership as part of American 
politics and law. I claimed that the central idea of liberty on 
which the American social contract depends is tied up with 
ownership of property, and that because of the physical 
capabilities they bring into being guns have become both a 
beacon of liberty for many Americans and an indispensable 
tool for its protection.   
 
The right to own guns is not simply weak rhetoric that 
advocates of guns cling to without scrutiny. It is a feature 
of the sense of American citizenship that many have come 
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to accept as legitimate. In a way that is not usually 
appreciated, American liberty includes the right to own 
deadly firearms.  
 
GUN CULTURE 
 
If we acknowledge that gun ownership is embedded in 
American politics, we next must consider how this form of 
politics manifests itself in culture and myth. The case above 
asserted that private property is foundational; that gun 
ownership is enshrined constitutionally based on a certain 
interpretation of American values of liberty and property. 
Here our claim is that over many decades these values have 
embedded themselves culturally, artistically and in the 
universal narratives through which Americans understand 
themselves, their fellow citizens, and the rest of the world.  
 
The term “culture” refers to the totality of norms and 
practices that comprise a given people’s traditions. Culture 
describes what is distinctive about a people’s shared 
existence; thus it is wider in scope than the earlier line of 
argument about individual ownership. “Culture” 
encompasses a collective way of life, those practices and 
institutions a people have created by processes largely of 
their own making. In speaking about culture, we are able to 
explore how gun ownership fits into the mosaic of 
language, religion, society and the arts that are basic 
features of American life. From that perspective, a cultural 
argument might conclude that current practices should be 
continued because people have legitimately come to 
identify with them; they have shaped peoples’ lives and 
become features of their personal identities. It seems 
obvious that gun ownership is an element of “American 
culture,” however construed. What is less obvious is what 
this implies in terms of peoples’ legitimate expectations. I 
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want to the fascinating way in which guns are fixed into the 
American political experience.  
 
The philosopher Charles Taylor uses the term “social 
imaginaries” to emphasize the features of that make each 
culture (or nation) distinctive. We are bound by culture 
because we are bound into “imaginary” cultural practices 
that surround us. Examples are easy to imagine. The 
mythology of the colonial frontiersman is never far from 
the surface, nor is the mythology of the cowboy in a hostile 
territory. Indeed, one finds a recurring evolution of 
characters and roles that highlight ownership of guns in 
connection with founding ideals of American society.  
 
It may be easy to dismiss these cultural models as “merely 
symbolic” or to respond by stating that cultural values shift 
over time; policies to constrain them go against the natural 
flow of history. But cultural arguments go deeper than they 
initially seem. It is not simply the occasional media 
representation, but a constant host of significant and 
influential roles—from Daniel Boone and John Wayne to 
Colonel Kurtz and Sargent Barnes—carry home the 
message that guns are beacons of basic liberty.  
 
Of course, these are not always the best role models for 
American citizens. But few would deny that they bring 
striking legitimacy to the cause of gun freedom. It is 
obvious that not all such narratives are socially beneficial. 
Subcultures of antisocial “gangsterism” are too common, 
and their rise implies a dangerous new evolution of guns in 
American culture. The prevalence of fear is likely the most 
significant rationale for gun ownership. Will Hauser and 
Gary Kleck have determined that guns and fear are related 
“asymmetrically”; in other words, “higher fear among 
nonowners encourages them to become gun owners, but 
lower fear among gun owners does not encourage gun 
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relinquishment” (Hauser and Kleck 2013: 271). Indeed, 
numerous studies confirm that victimization and perceived 
risk of victimization increase the likelihood of a person 
owning a gun for self-protection (see Kleck, Kovandzic, 
Saber and Hauser 2011).   
 
But we can and should draw the right conclusions from our 
values of fairness and legitimate expectations. If gun 
ownership is elemental to the American national ideal, then 
the sense of gun ownership (outlined above) will have been 
continuously internalized by successive generations of 
Americans. Countless citizens had their own valid reasons 
to pattern their lives in accordance with accepted social 
aspirations. Therefore, restrictions on gun ownership 
should be judged against a presumption against newly-
imposed restrictions.  
 
GUN FREEDOM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
 
To summarize the previous discussion, I put forward two 
lines of argument which gun ownership restrictors tend to 
neglect. For somewhat obvious reasons, they underestimate 
the centrality of gun ownership and the role it plays in 
American life. But there is a third line of argument that 
advocates of gun ownership neglect. Although it seems 
more complex and demanding than those identified above, 
we will benefit from drawing out and elaborating the vision 
of society it derives from.   
 
Those who would restrict gun ownership envision society 
through the lens of public safety. It is not freedom to own 
guns, but freedom from guns, that marks this side of the 
debate. To clarify the vision, we can describe gun safety in 
the terminology of “public goods.” I will suggest below 
that safety from gun violence is a public good which, 
although somewhat obscure and difficult to defend, lends 
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credence to the gun-restricting platform. Ultimately it is 
rooted in a proposition mentioned previously: If freedom to 
own guns is dangerous to public safety, gun ownership 
should be regulated to a degree that effectively affirms 
public safety. Again, the social costs of gun ownership 
become the central issue in the regulation of deadly 
weapons” (Cook and Ludwig 2006).   
 
The notion of “public good” is wide enough to include both 
natural and human-created resources: clean air and water; 
public services like electricity; minerals and topsoil; high 
literacy; democratic competence and national feeling. All 
such goods are valuable to the community as a whole and 
their cultivation is itself a public good justified by its 
benefit the community as a whole. One can find countless 
public goods distributed unevenly across the world’s 
existing regions, and one can envision many other public 
goods which have yet to be achieved.  
 
A parallel way to think about public goods is to think in 
terms of “common resources”. Public spaces like parks and 
wildlife preserves can be conceptualized as common 
resources and so can clean air and water, which are among 
the most essential global resources still remaining but not 
yet owned. Access to natural resources, on this view, is 
conceived as a trust wherein the authorities are tasked to 
manage and maintain them for the benefit of the 
community. We can think of others in terms of the creation 
and development of common public resources.  
 
Of course, as American ecologist Garrett Hardin (1915-
2003) once argued,iv common resources are susceptible to 
private exploitation. Hardin’s famous example of a small 
community of shepherds reveals a dangerous social 
tendency; in any such community, individual shepherds see 
the obvious benefit of increasing their private herds while 
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the community as a whole fails to foresee the threat posed 
by over-exploitation of their essential grazing pasture. 
Indeed, Hardin claimed, even the existence of the shepherd 
community is in jeopardy due to the individual decisions of 
so many shepherds.   
 
Public goods are concerned with common resources, and 
they are effectively managed only when they bring about 
positive social outcomes. It is part of our notion of 
common resources and public goods that restrictions will 
be necessary to protect the resource from excessive use. 
But the restrictions need not be onerous, and their benefit 
is shared universally. Public goods require a degree of 
state control, but in many instances such control is 
justifiable and to the advantage of all. A few might prefer 
unlimited freedom of action, but we undeniably benefit as 
a whole from the restrictions imposed by coercive 
governing authorities.   
 
It seems clear that Hardin’s example exaggerates the 
necessity of this social dynamic. He simply accepts that 
communities are doomed to fall into the same self-
interested pattern of behaviour. But as we know, many 
successful communities have learned to manage the 
dynamic; promoting and protecting a common resource 
depends on mutual trust and bonds of social affection, and 
where these virtues are present, the value of the public 
good is seen as outweighing the problematic constraints.  
 
Thinking specifically about the public good of safety from 
gun violence, we can develop three related lines of 
argument. (1) First, high levels of gun ownership are 
empirically related to high gun mortality. Such an argument 
would draw upon from scientific and social-scientific 
studies of American society, several of which point 
decisively to grave and unintended consequences force us 
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to re-think rates of production of at least of new firearms. 
“Gun ownership is positively related to gun-related suicides 
and homicides; there is evidence that guns do not merely 
serve as substitutes for other means of killing, but increase 
the overall rates of suicide and homicide” (Stroebe 2013: 
1). Similarly, Cook and Ludwig focus on the “negative 
externalities of gun ownership”. Their study is designed to 
shows that “under certain reasonable assumptions, the 
average annual marginal social cost of household gun 
ownership is in the range of $100 to $1800” (Cook and 
Ludwig 2006: 379).  
 
Others claim to have found “positive externalities” of gun 
ownership. It is claimed, for example, that “one million 
times each year homeowners and storekeepers protect their 
property and lives using firearms; often this occurs without 
a shot being fired. The mere sight of a gun often is enough 
to send a robber running.” “The peace that arises from this 
disinclination or inability to commit another crime is a 
positive externality of gun ownership” (Kell 1991). In other 
words, one should not presume that gun safety is only or 
necessarily brought about by restrictions, other than 
protections, around gun ownership.   
 
(2) Secondly, by drawing on a comparison with Canadian 
society we can begin to understand why the public good of 
gun safety can be achieved with little sacrifice to personal 
liberty. It must be acknowledged that the Canadian 
comparison is sometime misleading; the two jurisdictions 
have different legal traditions and different regimes of 
regulation. But one assertion can be asserted with utmost 
confidence: Canada’s consistently enforced regulation of 
the firearms industry, and of the practices of hunters and 
collectors, have promoted the public good of gun safety 
without appreciably diminishing the right to own firearms.   
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In Canada, restrictions on gun ownership have been set in a 
balance; gun safety is protected from overuse by 
restrictions balanced with benefits shared universally. If I 
speak as a Canadian citizen, one who takes pride in the 
level of gun safety we have managed to collectively 
achieve, it may become clear why I consider gun safety to 
be a public good par excellence. Although statistics suggest 
that Canadian society is increasingly adopting a permissive 
set of policies with respect to gun ownership, and although 
many gun owners argue passionately for greater gun 
freedom, it must be said that gun violence in Canada is 
regulated in ways that benefit all Canadians. Canadian 
citizens enjoy the public good of safety from deadly 
firearms because we have accepted minor restrictions on 
gun freedom as individuals.  
 
Despite the comparison, the gun-restricting camp has 
neither expressed nor defended it in a manner that 
emphasizes the importance of this public good. In order to 
be successful, a vision of gun freedom must be exposed to 
public authorization among the American people. Bringing 
this vision of American society into being calls for unified 
activism over time, perhaps over multiple generations.   
 
(3) A third line of argument expands the reasoning of the 
American political philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002). In 
his Theory of Justice,v Rawls developed a series of now-
famous arguments about political justice which together 
provide a powerful method for reasoning about public 
dilemmas in a democratic state. In effect, Rawls offers a 
test of legitimacy in which a group of imaginary citizens 
deliberates and ultimately determines the governing 
institutions of the society they would later inhabit.  
 
The key constraint is what Rawls calls the “veil of 
ignorance.” Those who are chosen to determine society’s 
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social institutions are barred from reasoning from a biased 
position. They are required to reason about social 
institutions as neutral citizens—that is, citizens unaware of 
personal markers such as gender, age, class, race and 
religion. Passing Rawls’s test allows us to say that a policy 
is legitimate; that it receives decisive sanction, not by the 
citizenry as a whole, but by an imaginary jury whose 
reasoning parallels as much as possible the mentality of the 
“perfect citizen.”   
 
Rawls’s argument reveals something unique about the 
American social contract; it seeks to penetrate the rhetoric 
and partisanship that too often hinders political discourse. 
At the deepest and most fundamental level, Rawls’s 
argument suggests that the expectations of individual 
citizens can be anticipated through the lens of a few central 
questions about the relationship between states and citizens.  
 
The most important conclusion according to Rawls is that 
those constrained by the veil of ignorance would insist on 
basic political rights and basic provision of resources for 
society’s disadvantaged members. Those behind the veil of 
ignorance would demand that all positions in society—even 
those of lower ranks on the social hierarchy—remain safe 
and dignified. Each of us has but one life to live, Rawls 
argued, and thus we are unlikely to expose ourselves to 
serious risks.   
 
Rawls’s conclusion may be debatable, but his rationale has 
inescapable implications. If it is true that perfectly neutral 
citizens would strongly favour a given policy, the policy is 
presumptively legitimate. When the issue of gun ownership is 
our application, we need simply to ask; would those behind 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance be convinced by the platform of the 
gun supporters, or would they instead endorse the arguments 
of gun ownership restrictors? Answers to this question bring 
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us to the centre of the gun ownership dilemma, and if a 
decisive answer is be found, from here we might begin to see 
the path towards future reconciliation.  
 
All the lines of argument canvassed above would be 
reasonable threads for Rawls’s imaginary jurors to 
contemplate. Each would be “on the table”, as it were; 
permitted within the constraints of Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance. On can visualize, for example, Rawls’s 
hypothetical jurors contemplating in an unbiased way the 
capacity of guns as instruments of personal liberty, and the 
importance to citizens’ identity of pervasive social roles. 
But we must also consider how they would insist on 
restrictions for reasons of public safety.   
 
Regarding the pivotal question about whether those behind 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance would affirm or deny substantive 
rights of gun ownership, I don’t believe it is absolutely 
clear how we should answer. One thing we should 
acknowledge is that Rawls’s jurors would be disposed to 
prefer gun safety—that is, freedom from guns, as that 
argument was spelled out above. Rawls himself maintained 
that those behind the veil of ignorance have only one life to 
live; their reasoning on public matters would tend towards 
prudence, caution and conservatism in relation to the risks 
of maximum social freedom.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is clearly the case that the above reflections about gun 
freedom are more philosophical than they are practical. In 
comparison to much of the commentary we encounter in 
journalism and media discussions, the arguments above 
rely on a normative or ethical analysis of justice and social 
issues. They require a greater commitment to philosophical 
engagement than is normally expected.  
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I have offered arguments which may strike the reader as 
modest and uncontroversial. Gun ownership has a place in 
American society that connects it with values of personal 
liberty and freedom from state interference, and this 
constellation of values, through two centuries of social 
development, has rooted itself in the public and private lives 
of countless American citizens. Largescale modification of 
citizens’ rights to own firearms threatens to betray this basic 
promise. And yet, on the opposite side, widespread patterns 
of gun ownership endanger the safety of citizens. Therefore 
ownership rights should be restricted, or at least regulated, to 
precisely that level which provides citizens with appropriate 
protection from preventable violence.  
 
More than enough studies have determined that rising 
gun ownership relates inversely to public safety; and 
from that proposition several conclusions may be drawn. 
Minor restrictions on ownership of firearms are 
warranted if and when they advance public safety; such 
restrictions are imposed in the interest of protecting 
Americans’ freedom against pervasive weapons and the 
threat they pose to the safety of citizens and to the 
United States as a national community.    
 
Gun ownership is something greater than a ‘mere’ 
constitutional right. It is not completely inaccurate to say 
that Americans view it as a “natural” right, or more 
precisely, as a right which anchors the American social 
contract. It is not the Second Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution that gives gun ownership social legitimacy; it 
is a deeper model of liberty and personal freedom, within 
which firearms always played a fundamental role. In two 
centuries since the founding of the U.S. Government, gun 
ownership has secured its own place in American society 
and culture through permeating messages and role models 
that valorize guns and those who own them.  
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Nevertheless, what I have called the public good of 
freedom from guns gives us a vision of the social and 
political situation that restrictors of gun ownership wish to 
bring into reality. That vision is always undercut by 
obstacles. Not only is it difficult to pin down or express in 
reasonably clear terms whether the vision is desirable to all, 
nor how it could be brought about. The paradigms of gun 
ownership are embedded culturally and socially in a way 
that proponents seem unwilling to appreciate.   
 
I would suggest that all the lines of argument discussed 
above have gone largely unnoticed by dominant voices in 
the gun ownership discourse. Although our discussion of 
values and deep social narratives assumes a broader 
philosophical scope than one usually expects, thinking in 
such terms, even if unfamiliar, might prove immensely 
helpful as we recast a democratic debate which shows little 
other cause for optimism. Broadening our scope in this way 
may help us to avoid the fixed patterns of argument which 
have become great impediments to progress on this urgent 
issue, and many others.   
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right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”.  
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